


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TRANSVERSAL PSYCHOLOGY
general part
aspects
of the philosophy
of behavior



academica

Gheorghe SCHWARTZ

TRANSVERSAL PSYCHOLOGY

GENERAL PART

ASPECTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF BEHAVIOR

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Translated by Adriana Vizental

Therefore, the non-initiated will appear to the non-initiated more convincing than the initiated, just as the orator can be more convincing than the doctor.

Isn't that what generally happens?

Socrates

(Plato–Georgias)

The conscience of the perceptive man has nothing to do with the machine, nor—perhaps—
with the living cell.

Antoine de Saint-Exupéry

(Ch, ques)

A Triple Preface

The long hesitations that preceded the writing down of the ideas that represent the subject of the following lines have made me realize that this undertaking requires at least three specifications. One, that results from the psychologist's inquiries; a second, that aims to put the writer at ease; and a third, that is at the core of the eschatological discourse of the philosopher—and also of the philosopher that lives inside every human being.

I. The psychologist's preface *Why a transversal psychology?*

A first specification is required: the author is convinced that his work is one of the latest empirical attempts to explain human behavior. We witness today an unprecedented progress in the world of science, when genetic engineering, biochemistry, biophysics, the thorough investigation of the cell, etc., have led to a new approach both to the relationship between the human being and nature, and to that between the human being and his own self. Never before has science developed so rapidly, producing applications and devices whose inner complexities fewer and fewer of us can understand, even if we use them all the time.

On the other hand, in school or at university, the typical way of teaching psychology is in the order of its constitutive processes: *sensations and perceptions, memory, attention, thinking, abilities, skills*, etc.. To these, the “*types of activity of the higher-level nervous system*” are generally added. Of course, such “decomposition” is made for didactic purposes. But the result is that the individual's life is fragmented to such an extent that it becomes unrecognizable. We are put in a situation similar to that of the customer standing in front of the butcher's counter: the nicely packed organs and pieces of meat may at best turn on his gastric juices, but the idea will not cross his mind that those parts once belonged to living organisms. When buying a piece of chop, he may be thinking of what it will look like in the plate, but not of the former animal, of its typical color, gentle eyes, and specific obstinacy to stay alive.

We are thus reaching a point where the mental processes appear like the thin wires in a cable's isolating wrap. Each individual wire is responsible for a message, or a part of the message, but is unable to function by itself. For example, according to current views, we can isolate only hypothetically “one item of attention” or “one piece of remembrance”; so much

the least can we imagine—even theoretically—a psychic process entirely of itself. (Science-fiction, however, offers such concepts, and who knows what tomorrow may bring—.)

Collectively—predominantly or distinctly—the mental processes work together to produce for our inspection a real-life kind of behavior. Whence results that “traditional psychology” focuses on transformation and on evolution. Cutting the above-mentioned cable transversally, we try to see what is going on in a fraction of time. But even this undertaking is not aimed at a static kind of assessment; a single parameter of **behavior**—the “**affective present**”¹ (**2.10.**)—is sufficient to show without a doubt that motion cannot be isolated from the moment. By cutting the cable transversally, the entire methodology changes: we no longer follow the isolated wires, but survey the numerous sections in full (inter)action. If we know, for example, how “*skills*” work, we then try to fit all the various pieces of information into a synthetic picture of that given moment. It would be ideal if the result of this exercise could explain *why I feel this way and not that way, and why I choose to do this and not that*. I am fully aware that the accuracy of our explanation (with all the consequences that might follow, if our information were exhaustive) is still vague and obscure, and not even the suggestions formulated here can solve the problem. They may open a new path for the intended debate, though: etymologically, psychology—and not only—declares itself to be *the science of the soul*; the continuous splitting up of the psychic processes, however, makes us inevitably lose sight of the whole picture. Today’s increasingly sophisticated specialized jargon leads us to the idea of progress in the field. But a new language does not necessarily convey a new message. We are faced here with the situation of the wizard apprentice who, in his concern to perfect his knowledge by decomposing the mechanism into its constitutive parts is, in the end, no longer able—or no longer wishes—to reassemble the parts into a functional whole.

Transversal psychology deals exclusively with the free and healthy human individual. With the human individual—because we have no knowledge of any other being’s *dialogue with eternity* and because only the human being has access to indirect memories (of things heard or read). With the free individual², because constraints prevent the individual who is not free from responding in a satisfactory way to the infinity of stimuli coming from the outside world that bombard him continuously and to which he responds according to the availability and quality of his receptors. And lastly, with the healthy individual, because illness and physical pain are in themselves **terrorizing elements** that prevent the formulation of responses typical for the times when he is healthy.

Transversal psychology deals with the reactions of the free and healthy human individual to the infinity of stimuli that bombard him in every fraction of time, knowing that for some stimuli the subject³ has receivers, while for others he has none⁴. **Transversal psychology**

delimits itself from *behaviorism* by the fact (too) that the responses are powerfully mediated, that the stimuli can be real or mere echoes of some past responses, that the stimuli represent no more than a primary cause and do not provide a direct way towards the effect. The reactions are by no means uniform, because **mood** depends on **education**, on **religion**, etc., and because **behavior** is a dynamic manifestation of the unique self's **mood**.

Transversal psychology attempts to recompose the whole, after it was so minutely chopped up for dissection.

II. The writer's preface **How thoroughly should we explain art?**

The roots of the present theory of **behavior** go back to my student years. My exclusive focus on some of its aspects—e.g. on the **pathological mosaic (1.1.)**—took me rapidly to the conclusion that, in the absence of a personal computer (which, in those days—almost forty years ago—was a mere dream not only for myself), I had no way of moving forward. Gradually, the enthusiasm of the hundreds of days spent in the university library of Cluj spent itself, but reminders of those preoccupations have recurred again and again in my books, sometimes even *explicitly*. [In my first novel, *The Witness* (1972), the main character, a psychiatrist, exposes a simplified version of my "theory"]. In addition, it has become a bet with myself to blend *implicitly* into the world of my fiction applications of those ideas—ideas that I could never get rid of. Gradually I realized that it was not only a theory of **behavior**, but also an attempt (however imperfect and fragmentary) to explain to myself the individual's attitude and behavior in his network of relations with himself and with those around him.

The urge to elucidate the problem and to free myself from it once and for all has lived within me for a long time, but it was never strong enough to make me sit down to systematize and write it down.

Then it so happened that, in 1992, as Cultural Adviser for the Romanian Embassy in Bonn, I and my peer diplomatic representatives were invited to visit the *Dokumente IX* in Kassel. Once there, we were first "coached" by Jean Hoet, the Belgian event organizer, then our next guide was a lady, who was not only very clever, but also a very good speaker. What Jean Hoet told us was intellectually brilliant and highly original and non-conformist; and yet, it had no major impact on my perception of the exhibits (apart from earning my respect for the vast energy and total dedication of a true professional); nor did the subsequent TV shows. But our lady-guide—a journalist and Philosophy graduate, in Kassel for merely the hundred days of the *Dokumenta*—imposed a dictatorial stroke on our interpretation of the exhibits. I must admit: without her interpretations, most of the few items we had the time to visit in just one day could not have revealed so many valences to my mind; nor could they have had such long-lasting effects. I accused her of forcefully invading my intimacy; I suggested that she should get into politics for making good use of her persuasive power; I told her it would not surprise me if she tried to convince us of the high artistic qualities of the fire extinguisher or the garbage container. With half an hour's preparation—she admitted—that would be no problem.

Obviously, a guide plays his specific part in a museum, but I am used to receiving details and explanation concerning the artist's historical background, significant data for the author's or

his model's biography, influences from schools contemporary to the moment of creation, etc.. No way would I expect Cicero to explain that the painting under discussion represents a count and not a camel. With external information added, the work reveals its hidden meanings. Stifled by authoritative explanation, it becomes no more than an "application" of a theory, reducing the subject to a mere annex (obviously, a very important one). A novel, I was thinking in those moments—and the idea was terrifying me—should have no additional book to explain it. It remains an artistic proposal that speaks for itself. I do not wish to extend the discussion to the implications of arts (visual and musical, in particular) in the context of their "cerebralization": today an audience needs theoretical initiation before entering a concert hall where dodecaphonic works are presented, or an exhibition pavilion containing proposals similar to those presented by Jean Hoet in Kassel. (The "amateur" admirer of a Leonardo painting, or—with a little goodwill, perhaps—a listener to Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, needed no such initiation; with the specification that, in modern art, goodwill is no longer sufficient).

As far as I am concerned, I must admit that I have published quite a few books of fiction, but no critic has ever commented on a single parameter of my "theory", which is always there at a deeper level. Unable to ever re-read a volume once published—being too "fed up" with it—I once imposed upon myself an experiment: ten year after it was published, I read again my novel "*The P Effect*". Nowhere else did I find so clearly exposed the majority of the parameters of my theory—and I understood how important it was to write the present work. Are my fiction books mere "applications"? I do not know. The fact that they could be read and discussed without this additional work gives me hope.

Anyway, the lines that follow have become a need for the writer that lives inside me.

**III. The professional philosopher's preface
and also that of the philosopher that lives inside each of us**
Why an "ecological soul?"

Initially, I wanted to name this book "The Ecological Soul". Not because I am a militant ecologist—far from me. One of my few extravagances is the pipe; I watch quite passively the spreading into the atmosphere of toxic fumes; and I cannot see myself rise in protest against the pollution of the oceans. In this respect, I have mainly a feeling of resignation.

The reason for that intention was entirely different: as shown before, man is subject to an infinity of stimuli, for some of which he has receptive organs, while for others he has none. Without sensations and perceptions, man is no more than a "vegetable", a vegetative being devoid of psychic processes. Unlike primitive organisms, with all his genetic endowment, the person who has no analyzers cannot survive alone in the world, but needs an assistant whose sensorial organs are functional to help him out with his own experience. In other words, the life of the psyche is dependent on what is received, and things can only be received with the help of the organs of sensory perception. This reflection of the individual into the environment, and of the environment into the individual—the only reflection that can generate spiritual life—would define the "ecological spirit". The psyche's dependence on how, and how much, it is "refueled" by the outside world is decisive. It is a direct consequence of the environment—even if, in many respects, man has also modified the environment he lives in.

Ever since Antiquity, training and education have been viewed as the means by which a subject, usually still docile, can be molded so as to respond in the most appropriate way—according to the customs and traditions of his time and place—to any stimulus he might encounter. But in this way, the signals we receive become mere landmarks by which we decide whether to act in one way or another. What is desired is an environment from which we should receive a large amount of positive messages.

I have said "messages", even though—as shown before—we are also confronted with signals that, for some reason, we do not process consciously, or with signals that we do not process at all. We live in a universe rich in stimuli: some of them—we decrypt; others—we receive but do not process; still others pass us by or through, but we do not perceive them at all. The first two categories leave traces.

These traces can be direct—consequences of certain direct or indirect experiences—triggering memories of facts actually experienced or discovered. That is why, our responses do not depend strictly on the signals that have triggered them, but also on the related elements they update. One and the same stimulus gives as many responses as the number of receivers it

encounters. The more mediated knowledge is, the more diverse the response, and the relationship between cause (the immediate stimulus) and effect (the receiver's correct response) becomes more difficult to discern. In any case, it is the environment—direct or recalled, imagined or taken over—which stands at the origin of each of our questions. Consequently, it is our environment—internal or external—which provides us with "our home"⁵, the ecosystem, the civilization we belong to, and determines the way we react. Such facts trigger the professional philosopher's questions, as well as those of the philosopher that lives inside every human being. They are questions we can answer according to our (best) abilities.

The three fundamental themes that determine our existence (the dialogue with eternity, the need for safety, and sex) are supplied in the same way, through the above described channels. To gain access to a greater number of sources, man looks for tools that can perfect his analyzers or provide him with new ones, as well as for more accomplished data processing methods. Sensations that cannot be brought to one's consciousness—like the Moon Sonata to a person born deaf, or the colors of Impressionist painters to someone who has never enjoyed the delights of sight—remain virtual.

The professional philosopher, and the philosopher that lives inside every human being, raise questions. "Big questions", as well as personally annoying ones ("Why did this have to happen to me?"; the vain person might say, "I knew this would happen!"). The responses various individuals give are not necessarily in tone with their ordinary behavior in life. But they carry the satisfaction of convictions. It would be artificial to attribute the "big question" to the philosopher, the lesser ones to the psychologist, the teacher, or the sociologist. Transversal psychology offers certain empirical landmarks to both categories. And, last but not least, the philosopher inside every one of us may also find some support in it.

Preliminaries

0.1.1. Do you remember? Nothing unexpected happened to you that morning, you didn't fall victim to any stroke of fate; you didn't get any sign that some danger was awaiting you in the predictable future; and neither did you suffer from any physical pain. In a word, it was one of those grey mornings in your life, impossible to distinguish mentally from those countless days that are neither good nor bad. Impossible to distinguish—and yet ... That morning you were so depressed that, perhaps, you do remember those hours. You were depressed without any "apparent cause". Life seemed to have no sense and the effort needed to merely survive such a mean destiny—a destiny lacking all reasonable motivation—seemed totally ludicrous. Hope itself had vanished completely. *Why? And why did it happen on that precise morning, otherwise so perfectly common?*

0.1.2. How about that cold evening, do you remember that? That evening when you were walking home after a workday like all the others? You didn't have any special successes that day, you weren't promoted, at home you knew there was nothing special awaiting you, no more than yesterday, or the day before yesterday and, most probably, no more than tomorrow. But you must remember that evening, at least because you felt more light-hearted and "freer" and—to some extent—"happier"⁶. *Why? Why was it that now you could shake off with a mere shrug, the haunting thoughts of your uselessness, of your inability to communicate—thoughts that had been tormenting you for so long?*

0.1.2.1. To explain the momentary emotional state of a human individual considered healthy and able to take personal decisions, there are only three possible answers:

1) either we refer to a metaphysical (why not, divine?) force whose caresses or warnings haunt us, heedless to our tiny "objective landmarks";

2) or, we think of impulses coming from some "hardly explainable existential spheres" pertaining to the speculative domain of parapsychology, or of reactions coming from senses we are unaware of, and we accept the spirit's other possibilities of investigation of the outside world (past, present and/or future) and of the self (in its various manifestations), other than those employed consciously by the non-initiated;

3) or, we declare ourselves content with explanations we can assess with the help of our research instruments (whose acuity is perfectible) and our judgment (limited at least by the landmarks we have available), our preconceived ideas, *level of intelligence, education and training*, our *preconceived expectations* (see 2.21), our relationship with God, and the limited

number of associations we can make in the restricted time span at our disposal before the configuration of the outside stimuli bombarding us changes.

0.1.2.2. The first two alternatives have their own fields of expression. But both theology (with all its branches) and parapsychology deal with subjects who are put in exceptional states, or who tend towards some exceptional state (e.g. the person specifically trained will interpret the mere act of raising one's eyes towards the sky as an act of separation from earthly things).

0.1.2.3. Exceptional are also the direct, easily detectable, causes of certain momentary emotional states: a success can lead to *joy*. If not, it means that either the respective success did not rise to the expected level, or it did not come at the proper moment, and that the effect (the satisfaction) did not cover all the parameters of **mood** that were functional at that moment. Similarly, a disease can induce an emotional state: from apathy to excitement, from despair to—more rarely—a state of optimism that is as unlimited as it is unjustified. But disease itself is an exceptional state⁷, one that transgresses the boundaries of the area within which, moment for moment, our **pathological mosaic (1.1.)** is being constructed. Disease involves a tendency towards the extremes, while health—hypothetical normality—tends towards the average, the centre.

0.1.2.4. Just as a broken leg makes us forget—at least for the initial hours—some annoying stomach-ache, a reason that goes beyond the limits of the ordinary eclipses for a while the parameters of our **mood**. It eclipses them, but does not root them out. How many long awaited moments are wasted or diminished in effect by causes that remain obscure? No matter how apt to change the picture of one's **mood** it might be, a reason that is strong or extreme (located far from the average, from the core) may become, at least for a while, **terrorizing** with respect to all the other stimuli; eventually, though, it will also be eclipsed by the parameters—which we shall discuss at large later on.

0.2. **Mood** is a momentary emotional state (see *Pinpoint duration element—behavior unit*, i.e. “the minimal physical time span below which no difference in duration is perceptible”—Henri Piéron⁸). It may change from one moment to the next, depending on the occurrence of a reason which is extreme, but which—equally and apparently—“has no particular reason”. Even in the second case, transition from a state of euphoria to one of deep melancholy may be as sudden.

0.2.1. Since our momentary emotional state is responsible for our numerous daily behavioral patterns, and it also participates in our less numerous **major decisions**, and since we know that the individual, under the impact of the same stimuli, does not always react in the same

way, we conclude that **mood** is not merely a static cliché, but can also be viewed as one image in a motion picture.

0.2.2. Viewed in this way, **mood**—with the accepted interpretation of "**momentary emotional state**"—establishes itself as **elementary unit of behavior** (which, developing in time, takes the form of a sequence of interwoven moments, a sequence of "momentary emotional states").

0.3. The relation that establishes itself between **behavior** and the great problems of humanity⁹ is similar to that between figure and background. Generally in this relation—when an explanation is attempted—, the following factors are considered: **level of intelligence, temperament, education, relation with God**, early obsessive spiritual experiences, obscure unconscious impulses. In "traditional psychology", **mood** does not find its place in this formula, nor is accepted its quality of *elementary unit* of **behavior**.

0.4. Getting beyond the "static" moment of **mood** and into the "dynamic" phase of **behavior**, we inevitably reach the red-hot point of decision making.

Only, in life, **major decisions**¹⁰ are fewer than we would like to believe. **Daily decisions** (such as: which tie should I wear today, what TV channel should I watch, what should I have for dinner, etc.), belong obviously to the realm of **mood**. Big decisions are few in a person's life. For example, one's choice of profession may result from a conscious option, an imposed one, or hazard; then, for a while or for a life-time, one's entire existence stands under the sign of that decision: one's daily program, the consequences of certain advantages / disadvantages, one's career promotion, etc.. If—keeping to our example—the external option comes from an external command center and overpowers the subject's will or remodels it, we find ourselves in situation **0.1.2.4**. When the decision comes by itself, "naturally", **mood** manifests itself—at least in the moment of its conscious formulation—as an arbiter of whether to make the decision publicly known or not.

0.4.1. What results from that moment pertains to the realm of **mood** and, in time, to that of **behavior**. During the long periods that follow the making of a **major decision**, our parameters will perform the function of regulators, the confrontation between them giving the picture of our subsequent **behavior**. As a consequence of a decision that was made long before, all our intentions, all our work, all our efforts, follow the strict route of our life's **path**.

0.4.2. In this context, we must not forget that that instant of such importance—the moment of making a decision—occurs in a moment circumscribed by a given time span, a short discharge—even when it was long and carefully planned. Why did it happen precisely in that moment—at seventeen hours, twenty-three minutes and six seconds—that I made

such an important decision, with long-lasting echoes? (I had courted my girlfriend for a week, a month, three years, and suddenly decided to propose marriage to her.) What results hence will last until I die, or until I make another decision (e.g. after years of marriage, I decide to break it up). Why did it have to happen precisely then—that Wednesday, at seventeen hours, twenty-three minutes and six seconds—that I made that decision? Although a decision takes serious preparation, **mood** interferes here again, allowing the subject to formulate his decision. Thus, even though it is terribly limited in time and *almost* unrepeatable, **mood** has dynamic consequences, which raise it beyond its limits.

0.5. *Ultimately, the question is this: why am I now doing this and not that? Why I am now able to do things that, at other moments, I wouldn't even imagine doing? Or, why was it that yesterday I didn't feel like doing something that has been one of my daily habits for such a long time?*

0.5.1. Even though it deals (primarily) with specific aspects pertaining to the functions of the psyche (memory, attention, thinking, etc.), basically, as a science, psychology strives to explain and describe **behavior**¹¹. The mental functions together merely make up a puzzle from which other and other components are continuously missing.

0.5.2. Just like in any field of research, tendencies become increasingly confined to a territory that is more and more specialized: empirical or experimental, the fragment is dissected to its tiniest pieces. Investigation goes deeper and deeper, the direction of the study being transferred from the wide horizontal plane, to the narrowest verticality. The countless holes drilled into the human soul make communication among them more and more difficult, while the overall image—the whole—remains somewhere at the surface and is forgotten; only students may occasionally show interest in examining it.

0.5.3. Over-specialization makes us lose sight of the whole. Obviously, thorough research of a certain aspect may provide more rigorous explanation for the whole; but fewer and fewer are those who can reconstruct the initial whole. Use of more sophisticated and more reliable nuts and bolts is justified only to equip the device they were designed for. Otherwise, they are likely to remain mere objects *per se*, or ... “works of art”.

0.6. In general—with the only exception of *behaviorism*, perhaps—the theories of **behavior** (true, especially those of **clinical behavior**) are built up around a single element: libido, or fear, or aggressiveness, or gregariousness, one's reaction to a feeling of inferiority or guilt, one's need for self-assertion, etc.. This almost unique *primordial* element attracts like a magnet other elements around itself, depending on how well they support its thesis or—to use the accepted language—according to the extent they support demonstration of the

nullified hypothesis. Thus, even if by intention the way is from cause to effect, it merely illustrates an idea accepted *a priori*.

0.6.1. Sciences called "humanistic" have a tendency to disguise their limits by employing increasingly sophisticated language. The "non-specialist" finds it harder and harder to read a book of psychology, for example, because the writer now uses a language that has become professional jargon. Even the basic words receive "special meanings" and things are read "differently"; such encoding, however, is often gratuitous, failing to define a notion more precisely, but merely fitting it more snugly into a pre-established code. This way, any banality is imbued with a scientific halo.

0.6.2. For my work, I shall try to ignore that code, returning to "non-specialized" language. In other words, I shall try to clarify (to myself) why I (or my characters) make a major decision at a certain moment, why I/they find a day like all the others happy or deeply unhappy, why I/they do not always find that life is worth living, but continue to function in spite of it all. Questions **0.1.1.**, or **0.1.2.**, will thus receive an answer. Just like many other questions, old and new. (Every question triggers other questions.)

0.6.2.1. Anything man attempts takes the form of words, triggering its own kind of intimacy between sender and receiver. In the present philosophy of **behavior**, many expressions carry the words' literal senses. For example, the term **mood** is used in a way that is totally different from that of classical psychology. Other terms employed carry different connotations.

0.6.2.2. Take, for instance, the term "**path**". With a major role in these lines, the term must be viewed as the smooth flow of a **behavior** that was not fractured by *terrorizing stimuli*. As shown later on, the pulsations of the psyche behave merely *as forces that endeavor to keep the individual on the path*, on the one hand, and *as forces that try to throw him off the path*, on the other. From this point of view, the **path** represents—together with **self-belonging**—the binder that keeps together the personality of the free and healthy human individual.

N.B. If the "fiction" writer tries to avoid answering questions, it is the scientist's duty to give answers. The writer merely raises questions. Sometimes, though, questions alone cannot be "received" by the audience, or they can only be received partially. Then, they say, it is the writer's fault.

A Possible Scenario of Human Behavior

A. Mood

(in a state called “normality” and “self initiative”¹²)

1.0.1. Let us now return to the *three fundamental chapters of human behavior*: the **dialogue with eternity**, **sex**, and the **need for safety**. They converge towards what we might call the **theme of survival**. Life involves religion, hope, attitude vs. death, power, fear, love, etc., which are all closely linked to these three chapters. The rest is mere paraphernalia. These three chapters are continuously refueled by the stimuli that give the individual his sensations, either directly, or by activating his indirect experience—received from books, learned, or listened to. With children, indirect experience is replaced by the adults' stories, by television, etc.. Animals *seem* to lack indirect experience: unlike humans, they only react to stimuli that they perceive directly. A second distinction between the human being and other living beings endowed with a nervous system is that, of the three fundamental chapters, there is no evidence that animals might also engage in a **dialogue with eternity**. The other two chapters, however—**sex** and **need for safety**—find full manifestation in the animals' **behavior**, defining it. (An entire literature of specialty has been dedicated to animal **behavior**, the animal being often viewed as a model for man's conduct.)

1.0.2. The scope of the present work is not polemical in nature and it will not quote excessively from famous names to support its assertions—although some ideas cannot be separated from their authors (e.g. the conditioned reflex can hardly be broken away from Behterev or Pavlov). If we fell pray to the lure of argumentation, this brief attempt would lose its conciseness and face the risk of deviating towards other directions. For instance, P. Janet defines *conduct* as a unity between the psyche and the acts of **behavior**. The present work will add nuances to this postulate. Reference to Janet deserves a discussion for itself. But trying to remain faithful to its proposed aim, this book will suggest other connotations for the terms “conduct” and “**behavior**”, rather than express opinions about the example given.

1.0.3. The present approach will not get into polemical disputes because they would inevitably take us to the “outer limit of common sense”—a “common sense” that has nothing to do with science or reason (usually in such cases, they are merely used to argument ignorance). The “outer limit of common sense” is reached when the questions raised sound increasingly like “children’s questions”, i.e. never ending, one triggering the next. In a sentence, one can ask for the meaning of every word in the statement. By establishing the exact (or intended) sense of a certain word, one can go on and request the equally exact definition of those words that explain the

previous one. And so on, indefinitely. And, “since there must be a limit to everything”, a defining of the definer will end when the “outer limit of common sense” has been reached. In fact, every response represents no more than a momentary stop along the strenuous quest for knowledge—or, at least, of research. Whence other itineraries may depart.

1.0.4. It has been established before (**0.2.2.**) that **mood** is the smallest unit of our **behavioral** state. *One moment's mood, plus the next moment's mood, plus (...), plus the mood of the final moment in a time segment, make up the behavior for that segment.*

1.0.5. Schematically—in tone with this entire work, constrained to the barbarous procedure of didactic dissection of the whole—the equation is valid mainly on the theoretical level. Practically, though, it rarely happens—even for a single full minute—that one or another of the parameters should not “stand out”, influencing in its course, for a short time, the entire picture.

1.0.6. All the more so, for the equation to apply, it is compulsory that no “major event”, no **terrorizing factor**, or at least no stimulus that should modify the fragile balance of the time span, should occur in the given moment.

1.0.7. In the next section, we shall describe the parameters we have already referred to briefly. Their order is not determined by a specific priority¹³. In fact, there is no “preferential succession”—except when one parameter is more emphasized than the others and manages, for a tiny fraction of time, to become *predominant* (i.e. a **terrorizing factor**).

Parameters of Mood

1.1. The pathological mosaic

1.1.1. As mentioned before, in order not to jeopardize the conciseness of this work, I shall not stop to discuss every specialized term. In this particular case, though, I must point out that the term “pathological” does not denote “illness”. On the contrary, **1.1.** would convey a different meaning if it got into the realm of the pathological. The next section will try to elucidate this paradox.

1.1.2. It is generally accepted that the *norm* is given by an average of opposites—I do not remember encountering a more precise definition of the *normal* in the specialized literature. (With all its implications, the term thus defined can offer material for analysis not only to psychiatrists and psychologists, but also to specialists in many other fields: philosophy, politics, sociology, aesthetics, political economy, etc.).